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In the Supre:me C.ourt of the 
State of Utah 
E. R. SHAW and ESSIE 0. SHAW, 
Plaint~ffs and Appellants, 
-vs.-
BAILEY-McCUNE COMPANY, et al., 
Defendants and Respondents. 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT ·O·F FACTS 
CASE NO. 
9206 
For a number of years prior to 1947 the defendants in 
the action below, W. Lee Bailey and Gayle J. Bailey, hus-
band and wife, were associated in business arrangements 
with one H. W. McCune and Grace McCune, his wife. Dur-
ing the year 1957 they conducted two partnerships to-
gether, one called Baimac Company, which only Mr. 
Bailey and Mr. McCune were partners (Tr. 5), and an-
other partnership called Bailey-McCune company, in 
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which both Mr. Bailey and 11r. l\icCune were partners, 
together with their wives (Tr. 5). 
On the 29th day of March, 19·47, the partnership of 
Bailey-McCune Company was incorporated, the incorpo-
rators and their stock interest in the corporation were: 
W. Lee Bailey, 100 shares; Gayle J. Bailey, 100 shares; 
H. W. McCune, 100 shares; Grace J. McCune, 100 shares; 
James P. McCune, 1 share ; and the Articles of Incorpo-
ration showed the stock to be $10 par and a paid in capital 
of $4,010.00. The accompanying affidavit stated that 
$4,010.00 had, in fact, been paid in cash. On the 1st day 
of April, 1947, the company ratified the Articles of In-
corporation and adopted the by-laws of Bailey-McCune 
Company. (See Plaintiffs' Exhibit 4.) Subsequent to 
incorporation, on the 1st day of April, 1947, the corpora-
tion held its first directors' meeting, the one at which they 
adopted the Articles and By-Laws, also elected officers, 
to-wit: W. Lee Bailey, president; Grace J. McCune, vice-
president; H. W. McCune, Secretary; and Gayle J. Bailey, 
treasurer. At that time the president presented a letter 
to the directors from Baimac Company, a partnership, 
consisting of W. Lee Bailey and Gayle J. Bailey, H. W. 
McCune and Grace J. McCune, offering to sell all of the 
operating assets of the said partnership to the corpora-
tion. IThe portion of the corporate minutes that covers 
this fact are found on Page 11 in the second portion of the 
book under the designation Directors' ]\feeting, Nephi, 
Utah, April1, 1947, which is set out as follows: 
"The president presented a letter 'vhich the 
directors received fron1 the Bain1ac Co1npany, a 
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partnership consisting of W. Lee Bailey, Gayle 
J. Bailey, H. W. McCune and Grace J. McCune, 
offering to sell all operating assets of said part-
nership subject to the present liabilities as shown 
by its books and records to the corporation in 
exchange for all of the capital stock of the corpo-
ration, all of the subscriptions for the capital 
stock of the corporation having been assigned to 
the members of said partnership. The letter and 
the accompanying balance sheet showed that the 
operating assets of the partnership are carried 
on the books as of JYfarch 31, 1947, at a net value 
of $41,548.08. Said offer was considered by the 
directors and they were unanimously of the opin-
ion that the assets were fairly worth at least their 
book value. Upon motion duly made, seconded 
and unanimously carried, it was resolved that the 
corporation issue all of its capital stock in the 
par value of $40,000.00 to the partners of such 
partnership as their interest may appear in ac-
cordance with the offer in exchange for all of the 
operating assets of said partnership, subject to 
the aforesaid liabilities, as listed on its balance 
sheet dated March 31, 1947, in the net amount 
of $41,548.08. Said operating assets and liabili-
ties consist of the following:" 
vVe will not set forth here the balance of that minute, 
however, all of the assets were transferred to the corpora-
tion from the partnership except the Check-R-Feed Com-
pany accounts receivable in the amount of $30,173.52, 
\\'"hich was left in the partnership. In other words, all of 
the assets of the partnership, except one accounts receiv-
able, were transferred and this one accounts receivable 
was left in the partnership and apparently the partner-
ship remained open. (See Exhibit 4, Page 13, Tr. 16.) 
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It would appear that the partnership of Bailey-McCune 
Company just changed its name to a corporation, how-
ever, what the assets of the Bailey-McCune Company, a 
partnership, were and how they become part of the 
Bailey-McCune Company, a corporation, is not disclosed 
by the corporate minute nor is it disclosed whether the 
corporation assumed the liabilities of Bailey-McCune 
Company, a partnership, although it appears the Bailey-
McCune Company, a corporation, took over the Bailey-
McCune Company, a partnership. (Tr. 6, Line 8, 9, and 
10.) 
On May 10, 1947, the officers and directors of the cor-
poration loaned to Bailey-l\fcCune Company the sum of 
$10,000.00 and took back notes payable to themselves in 
that amount dated May 9, 1947. 
On August 31, 1948, W. Lee Bailey sold to Bailey-
McCune Company stock in the Juab Valley Feed Com-
pany for $5,000.00 and took back from the Bailey-McCune 
Company, a corporation, a promissory note in that 
amount. On the same day the two principal stockholders, 
McCune and Bailey, got together and divided the assets 
of the Bailey-McC·une Company, a corporation, giving 
to McCune 50 shares of the capital stock of the Juab 
Valley Feed Company; a 1942 Studebaker; the pronlis-
sory note of the corporation in the an1ount of $16,600.00 ~ 
a promissory 'note of the. corporation in the amount of 
$1,650.00; and cash in the a1nount of $1,750.00, in return 
for which the corporation got back 2,000 shares of its own 
capital stock which it cancelled. This transaction in-
creased the liability of the corporation by $18,250.00, re-
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duced its assets by $7,250.00, reduced its capital by 
$20,000.00. 
On the same day, the 31st of August, 1948, at a meet-
ing held between the new stockholders and directors of 
the corporation, H. W. McCune and Grace J. McCune 
tendered their resignations and W. Lee Bailey and Gayle 
J. Bailey were apparently elected to serve as the only 
officers and directors of the corporation, W. Lee Bailey 
being elected president and treasurer and Gayle J. Bailey, 
vice-president and secretary; and were the only stock-
holders and directors as sho,vn by the minutes. 
On the 23rd day of May, 1951, Bailey-McCune Com-
pany entered into a lease agreement with the plaintiffs to 
lease their premises for a period of five years, which 
lease agreement is shown as Exhibit 6. In addition, the 
Bailey-McCune Company and/or W. Lee Bailey and 
Gayle J. Bailey, purchased from the plaintiffs, E. R. Shaw 
and Essie 0. Shaw, his wife, merchandise and equipment 
for the sum of $6,601.66. (Note. The Court found that 
only the corporation entered into the lease agreement and 
made the purchase of these supplies and equipment.) 
During the time that the Bailey-McCune ·Company, 
a corporation, was in the building numerous payments 
were made on the rental due with. checks of the Bailey 
Investment Company and numerous transactions tran-
spired between W. Lee Bailey, Gayle J. Bailey and the 
Shaws. From this time on, 1\1ay 23, 1951, the affairs of 
the Baileys and/or the Bailey-~IcCune Company, went 
from bad to worse, rent became delinquent and eventually 
on or about the 22nd day of April, 1957, the Shaws served 
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Notice to Quit upon the Bailey-McCune Company and 
upon W. Lee Bailey and Gayle J. Bailey personally, and 
near the end of May, approximately the 31st day of May, 
1957, the defendants moved from the premises taking all 
assets, merchandise, equipment, whereupon this action 
was commenced. 
The Springville Banking Company was included as a 
party defendant for it claimed a mortgage interest in 
property which is subject to a landlord's lien and upon 
the litigation of the matter the Court preferred the land-
lord's lien of the plaintiffs to the mortgage and to other 
creditors in the amount of $825.00 and gave judgment to 
the plaintiffs against the Bailey-McCune Company, a 
corporation, in the amount of $5,176.34, together with 
an attorney's fee in the amount of $300.00. The facts con-
tained in the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Amended Judgment have been stipulated as being accu-
:rnte as a matter of calculation, the only issue remaining 
on appeal being the question of whether the defendants, 
W. Lee Bailey and Gayle J. Bailey, his wife, are person-
ally liable. 
STATEMENT ·OF POINTS 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND 
THE DEFENDANTS, W. LEE BAILEY AND GAYLE J. 
BAILEY, PERSONALLY LIABLE TO THE PLAINTIFFS IN 
T'HE AMOUNT OF THE JUDGMEN'T RENDERED BY THE 
TRIAL COURT AGAIN8T BAILEY-McCUNE COMPANY, A 
CORPORATION. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND 
THE DEFENDAN1TS, W. LEE BAILEY AND GAYLE J. 
BAILEY, PERSONALLY LIABLE TO THE PLAINTIFFS IN 
THE AMOUNT OF THE JUDGMEN'T RENDERED BY THE 
TRIAL COURT AGAINST BAILEY-McCUNE COMPANY, A 
CORPORATION. 
It is obvious from the very beginning of this corpora-
tion that it was for sham purposes. The corporation was 
founded for the sole purpose of continuing the partner-
ship that previously existed. (Tr. 6) The recitations 
contained in the Articles of Incorporation are apparently 
false in so far as they pertain to the capital stock of the 
corporation and the amount subscribed by each of the 
parties and in respect to the oath of the incorporators at 
the bottom of the Articles of Incorporation. For example, 
they have set forth in their Articles of Incorporation that 
there had been 401 shares of stock issued, totaling 
$4,010.00, and that for these shares of stock they had 
paid in cash to the company $4,010.00. (Plts. Exhibit 
±, Page 4) This is obviously false and fraudulent, for Mr. 
Bailey, on cross-examination, stated that he had put his 
money in in the form of assets of the Baimac c·orporation. 
(Tr. 17, L. 13 on) It was obvious from his testimony that 
he was not speaking of an initial contribution of $1,000.00 
on the part of each principal incorporator, for there was 
never $4,010.00 paid in to the corporation even though the 
verified Articles stated that amount had been paid in. 
Furthermore, by looking at the stock book, it is clear that 
there were no certificates issued as shown in the Articles 
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of Incorporation and, in fact, the 401 shares set out in 
the Articles were never issued. (Pits. Ex. 4, P. 4; Pits. 
Ex. 5) 
Mr. McCune, one of the initial incorporators, 
never at any time owned any stock in the corporation as is 
shown from the stock certificate book. If that is the 
circumstance, then his position in the Articles is merely 
nominal, formal, but not substantial. It is a familiar 
maxim of law that "the law respects form less than 
substance." The substance of this corporation is that the 
partnership continued and the corporation form was a 
mere shell; James P. McCune never receiving any stock 
and the initial 401 shares not having been issued and the 
$4,010.00 not having been paid in, and the oaths of the 
incorporators being false and fraudulent. 
In support of the above contentions, we cite to the 
Court Utah qode Annotated 1943, 18-2-6 which sets forth 
a minimum amount of capital stock required to be sub-
scribed and paid in : 
"To the articles of incorporation prepared in 
accordance with the provisions of the preceding 
section there shall be added the oath or affirma-
tion of three or more of the incorporators, taken 
before any officer duly authorized to administer 
oaths, to the effect that they have commenced, 
or it is bona fide their intention to commence and 
carry on, the business mentioned in the articles of 
incorportion, and that the affiants verily believe 
that each party to the articles of incorporation 
has paid or is able to and will pay the amount of 
the capital stock subscribed for by him; and that 
at le,ast ten per cent of the capital sto-ck subscribed 
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by e,ach stockholder and not less than ten per cent 
of the capital stock of the corporation has been 
paid in. * * «c." 
Utah Code Annotated 1943, 18-2-7, Payment of Sub-
scriptions with Property: 
HWhere subscriptions to the stock of any cor-
poration, except corporations organized for min-
ing or irrigation purposes, shall consist in whole 
or in part of property necessary to the pursuits 
agreed upon, the articles of incorporation shall be 
further supplemented by the affidavits of three 
persons to the effect that they are acquainted with 
such property and that it is reasonably worth the 
amount in cash for which it was accepted by the 
corporation." 
In respect to a director's liability for knowing the 
law, knowing what he is signing an oath to his liability 
for damages resulting from the untruthfulness of such 
corporate representations, are set forth in Ashley v. 
Peters, 128 Neb. 338, 258 N.W. 639, 99 ALR 844. In that 
case it is stated: 
"Directors should know of, and give direction 
to, the general affairs of the institution and to 
its business policy, and have a general knowledge 
of the manner in which the business is conducted. 
No custom or practice can make a directorship 
a mere position of honor, void of responsibility. 
* * * Where the duty of knowing exists, ignor-
ance due to negligence of duty on the part of a 
director creates the same liability as actual knowl-
edge and a failure to act thereon. * * * ." 
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The above case involves the question of whether the 
directors knew what language was contained in bonds 
issued by the corporation. The response of the directors 
was similar to the response of Mr. Bailey in Court, that 
he had complete confidence in his attorney and did know 
that he was doing wrong. In this case the Court imposed 
personal liability on the director. 
A second fact which is of considerable importance 
in this case is that of the date of incorporation. The 
accountants for Bailey-McCune Company, a partnership, 
prepared a financial statement wherein they set forth 
the assets of the corporation and a beginning balance 
sheet of the corporation. (Def. Ex. 17) The beginning 
balance of the corporation, you will note, had $2,060.56 
in as cash and showed no amount as having been paid in 
by the stock subscribers, but indicated the capital struc-
ture of the company to be as shown by the Board of Dir-
ectors' meeting April 1, 194 7. In other words, all~ of the 
stock of Bailey-McCune Company, a corporation, was is-
sued for $41,548.08, a calculated net worth of Bailey-
McCune Company, a partnership. It is apparent that at 
the time of founding this corporation the partnership had 
in mind transferring all of these assets for stock, and 
if that were the circumstance, then where is the affidavit 
required by the law of the State of Utah setting forth 
the true value of the goods and merchandise transferred 
for stock. This affidavit is not to be found~ 'vhich is an-
other evidence of fraud. By making false statements as 
to paid in capital they could fraudulently avoid the legal 
·· requirement of an affidavit of value. (U.c·.A. 1943, 18-2-7) 
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Furthern1ore, we point out to the Court that th'3 
capitalization of the company cannot be more than 
$40,000.00, as shown by the Articles of Incorporation. 
Against this was transferred to the company the liabili-
ties of $85,478.33. It is also interesting to note that the 
partners deleted from the assets of Bailey-McCune Con1-
pany, a partnership, an accounts receivable of $30,173.52, 
which they kept personally. From the minutes of April 
1, 1947, and the financial staten1ent introduced by the de-
fendants, (Def. Ex. 17), it is clear that assets of question-
able value were transferred to the company and that lia-
bilities of fixed value were received by the company and 
the fixed value of the liabilities exceeded by 100% the 
capitalization of the corporation. 'This cannot be said to 
have been an honest incorporation, especially in view of 
the fact that the primary and apparently most valuable 
asset was deleted from the assets of the corporation and 
kept personally by the partners, and we have no proof 
as to the actual value of assets as required by la,v. 
(U.C.A. 1943, 18-2-7) The Court is well aware that finan-
cial statements can be prepared which are totally untrue 
and do not reflect the actual value of the corporation. 
The history of this company indicates that it was 
under-capitalized and over-indebted. This is especially 
so when we see that the assets were supposedly in the 
$127,000.00 category and yet the cash balances are ap-
proximately $2,000, indicating less than two per cent 
liquidity, which is a risky financial beginning for a corpo-
ration with an-indebtedness of $85,000.00 plus. Further-
more, the fact that the partners had to lend the corpora-
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tion $5,000.00 within a month after incorporation verifies 
this contention and refutes their oath that they had paid 
in $4,010.00 in cash. (Plts. Ex. 4, P. 6) · 
Let us take the legal consequences of capitalizing d. 
company for an amount less than half the indebtedness 
of the company. This should be considered to be a fraud 
upon the creditors as being an insufficiently capitalized 
company. The situation is a fortiori on August 1, 1948, 
the date of the withdrawal of 1\IcCune. By that time anal-
ysis of the minutes of the company shows that the com-
pany has assumed other liabilities, to-wit: 
(1) $5,000.00 borrowed from Mr. Bailey and Mr. 
McCune on May 10, 1947, (a fact which makes it obvious 
that the company did not have sufficient operating capital 
at the time of its incorporation (March 27, 1947), and 
show that these people did not want to take stock for their 
interest, but would rather loan the money to the corpora-
tion and become creditors of it) ; 
(2) A lease on September 10, 1947, from Baimac 
Company, which is also made up of the partners who were 
the only stockholders of the company, 'vhich is an obliga-
tion of the company; 
(3) -'The purchase of property in Spanish Fork for 
the sum of $15,961.00 to be paid in monthly payments of 
$200.00. (There is no indication that anything was paid 
down on the said property.); 
( 4) The purchase of 50 shares of stock in Juab 
Feed Company from Lee Bailey for the sum of $5,000.00 
and the making to him a note to· that extent; and 
( 5) Giving to Mr. l\fcCune assets and notes valued 
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13 
in the a1nount of $25,500.00 on the 31st day of August, 
1948; thereby increasing the company's liabilities, by the 
minutes, within one year by $41,500.00 from the $8'5,-
±78.33, making the total liabilities of the company at ap-
proximately $128,000.00, less whatever they paid on them 
within that year. These transactions also reduced the 
assets by $7,250.00 and reduced the capital stock by $20,-
000.00. In other words, by August 31, 1948, by the cor-
poration minutes, it appears that the company's liabilities 
were approxhnately $128,000.00, less whatever they had 
paid on them during that year, against a $20,000.00 capi-
talization and a $7 ,2.50.00 reduction in assets. 
This is not considered an honest, fair dealing type of 
transaction which the Court will tolerate. In the first 
place, it is obvious from the transfer of the Juab Feed 
stock that Mr. Bailey did not want to become a stock-
holder in the company, but merely a creditor, and the 
same goes for Mr. McCune. (Tr. 21; Pits. Exh. 4, P. 21) 
Mr. H. W. McCune takes back a note from the corporation 
with the Juab Feed Company stock and Mr. Bailey takes 
a note from the corporation for the stock, rather than 
trading to Mr. McCune directly stock for stock, thereby 
maintaining the capital in somewhat the same condition 
in respect to this $5,000.00. This is an indication of their 
bad faith. It cannot be said that bad faith isn't a present 
material fact in all of these transactions. A case in point 
is Auomotr£z Del Golfo De Cal. v. Resnick, which is found 
in -!7 Cal. 2d 792, 306 P.2d 1, 63 ALR 1042. The ·Court 
said this: 
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"Another factor to be considered in determin-
ing whether individuals dealing through a corpora-
tion should be held p-ersonally responsible for the 
corporate obligations is whether there was an at-
tempt to provide adequate capitalization for the 
corporation. In Ballantine on Corporations (rev 
ed, 1946), at pages 302.-303, it is stated: 'If a cor-
poration is organized and carries on business with-
out substantial capital in such a way that the cor-
poration is likely to have no sufficient assets avail-
able to meet its debts, it is ~nequitable that share-
holders should set up such a fltmsy organizatvon 
to escape personal li.ability. The attempt to do 
corporate business without providing any suffi-
cient basis of financial responsibility to creditors 
is an abuse of the separate entity and will be in-
effectual to exempt the shareholders from corpo-
rate debts. It is coming to be recognized as the 
policy of the law that shareholders should in good 
faith put at the risk of the business unencumbered 
capital reasonably adequate for its prospective 
liabilities. If the capital is illusory or trifling 
compared with the business to be done and the 
risks of loss, this is a ground for denying the 
separate entity privilege.' '' 
In the case above cited the Court imposed personal 
liability. 
Furthermore, let us take a look at the lT tah Statutes. 
The law in Utah in 1948 'vas Utah Code Annotated 1943, 
18-2-17: 
"No corporation shall make or pay any divi-
dend except fro1n the surplus profits arising fron1 
the business of the corporation and in the cases 
and manner allo"\ved by la"T; nor divide, wi·th-
draw, or in any ntanner ea:cept as prov1~ded by 
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la'U1 pay to the stockholders or any of thern, any 
part of the capital of the corporation." 
Consider how Mr. and Mrs. H. W. McCune withdrew 
from the corporation : 
Q. (By Mr. Howard) You have told us today 
how the transaction came about in respect to 
buying ~1r. McCune's interest in the company, 
have you not' 
A. I think so. 
Q. Let me ask you if you didn't say it came about 
this way: On July 12th, 1958, and I am refer-
ring to page 6, line 11 of your deposition-line 
9: 
Q. You purchased their interest' 
A. Well, it was retired. 
Q. Was it purchased by you or by the com-
pany' In other words, did you buy the 
stock or did the company itself buy the 
stock of these people' 
A. Well, I had better answer that in this 
\vay. We had holdings consisting of agri-
culture, dairy farm, turkey farm, and 
when the meeting took place, we divided 
up, he took this and that and that and so 
on in the transaction. After he had taken 
the assets, the personal assets of various 
things I owed him $1650.00 cash which 
was paid to him, and as a result of that 
why all of the stock in Bailey-McCune 
Company, as of that date, was acquired 
by Gayle J. Bailey and myself. 
Q. Wasn't that your testimony' 
A. The Joseph N. Costello Company-
Q. Wasn't that your answer' 
A. I guess that was my testimony. (Tr. 67, L 8 
through 29) 
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What this plainly amounts to is a division of par~tner­
ship assets by partners. 
Utah Code Annotated 1943, 18-2-18: 
"No corporation shall receive or discount any 
note or other evidence of debt with the intent to 
enable any stockholder to withdraw any part of 
the money paid in by him on his stock, except as 
provided by law." 
Another fact which should be considered is the rela-
tionship between the corporation and the partnership, 
which it succeeded. In this case the corporation merely 
continued the same name as the partnership, had the 
same partners, with the exception of James P. McCune, 
who is represented under oath to be a stockholder but to 
whom no stock was ever issued. 
Sweet v. Watson's Nursery, 92 P.2d 814: 
"A corporation with only two stockholders, 
the stockholders and directors of which held no 
meetings for four years and all personal business 
of stockholders was transacted through bank ac-
count of corporation, was the alter ego of stock-
holders who were individually liable for damages 
for breach of warranty in sale of property of cor-
poration." 
"When a corporation is organized or perpetu-
ated for particular purposes of carrying out plans 
of partners or associates in business, the courts 
will look through the corporation to the individuals 
and the rule applies irrespective of whether corpo-
ration be deemed a 'one-man' corporation or a 
'two-1nan' corporation." 
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rrhis case is in point in that it was a corporation 
fortned to carry out the business of a partnership and 
continued its business in the same manner as it had prior 
to its incorporation. No substantial change in business 
procedure, in spite of the statutory requirements to the 
contrary. 
"The rule is clear that where a corporation 
is merely the business conduit of an individual or 
partners, the courts will look through the corpora-
tion to the individual. Wenban Estates, Inc. v. 
Hewlett, 193 Cal. 675, 695, 227 P. 723; Continental 
Securities etc. Co. v. Rawson, 208 Cal. 228, 2'38, 
280 P. 954. When a corporation is organized or 
perpetuated for the particular purpose of carry-
ing out the plans of partners or associates in busi-
ness, the same rule has been held to apply, and 
whether the corporation be deemed a 'one-man' 
corporation, or as here claimed, a 'two-man' cor-
poration, the rule is the same. D.N. & E. Walter 
& Co. v. Zuckerman, 214 Cal. 418, at page 420, 6 
P.2d 251, 79 ALR 329; Wise Realty Co. v. Stewart, 
169 Cal. 176, 146 P. 534." 
It is shown from the minutes of the company that 
after its institution and initiation it never held any stock-
holders meetings, ( Tr. 69, L 27, 28, 29), never re-elected 
officers, never kept a stockholders minute book, and such 
minutes as have been kept are of such infrequent intervals 
as to indicate only occasional adherence to corporate for-
mality. 
Speaking of corporate formalities-that have not 
been complied with-we are necessarily confronted with 
the next fact situation which is inconsistent with corpo-
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rate existence and compatable with personal liability. For 
example, Article VII of the Articles of Incorporation of 
Bailey-McCune Company is as follows: 
"ARTICLE VII 
The officers of this corporation shall be as 
follows: (a) Boar·d of Directors consisting of four 
persons, three of whom shall constitute a quorum; 
(b) a president; (c) a vice-President; (d) a secre-
tary ; and (e) a treasurer. All of such officers 
must be stockholders of the corporation, and the 
president and vice-president must be directors. 
The directors shall be elected by a majority vote 
of the capital stock represented at the annual 
meeting of the stockholders, and the directors shall 
from their members, appoint the president and 
vice-president at their first meeting after the regu-
lar annual meeting of the stockholders. The dir-
ectors shall also appoint the secretary and treas-
urer, and the same person may hold both offvces. 
All of such officers shall hold office for a term of 
one year and until their successor is elected and 
qualified. The Board of Directors shall fill any 
vacancies occurring in the offices of the corpora-
tion for any cause, and any of said officers may 
be removed for cause by a two-thirds vote of the 
capital stock represented at any annual or special 
meeting of the stockholders.'' (Emphasis added.) 
(Pits. Ex. 4, P. 4) 
You will note that the officers of this corporation 
shall be four persons. That does not say tw·o persons 
holding four offices, but intends four persons and it 
specifically says that the secretary-treasurer n1ay be the 
same person, which by rules of legal interpretation, in-
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clusio unius est excl u~io alterus, necessarily means that 
they are the only two offices that can be held by the same 
person. Compare this with Article III of the By-Laws: 
''ARTICLE III 
'-1. A board of four directors shall be chosen 
annually by the stockholders at their annual 
meeting in accordance with the Articles of In-
corporation, and shall hold office for one year 
and until their respective successors are elected 
and qualify. 
2. Regular meetings of the Board of Di-
rectors shall be held at such time and place as 
the directors may by resolution determine, and 
no notice of such regular meetings shall be re-
quired. Special meetings may be called by the 
president or any two directors by giving five 
days notice to each director, or special meetings 
may be held at any time by unanimous consent 
of the directors. Three d~rectors shall consti't'ute 
a quorum for the transaction of business." (Em-
phasis Added.) 
It is obvious from Article 'TII of the Articles of 
Incorporation and Article III of the By-Laws that all 
of the meetings of directors since August 31, 1948, have 
been invalid for failure to have a quorun1, and for failure 
to have a board of directors as required by Utah Code 
Annotated 1943, 18-2-20. In other words, until there 
are four people elected as directors there was no Board 
and there could be no quorum without three directors 
present. Both Mr. and Mrs. Bailey admitted that there 
had been no amendment to the Articles of Incorporation 
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and no amend1nent to the By-Laws (Tr. 28, 70) and, 
consequently, these are the only rules for the government 
of the corporation. 
It further shows with great clarity that Mr. and 
Mrs. Bailey were not interested in conducting their affairs 
according to the rules set forth in the By-Laws but 
conducted the corporate affairs as if it were their own 
personal business and as they saw fit in respect to 
directors' and stockholders' meetings. For example, con-
sider the co-mingling of funds between Bailey-McCune 
Company, the corporation, and Bailey Investment 
Company ('Tt. 58) and the Baileys themselves. In re-
spect to the needs of the Baileys, they drew money 
against a salary account as they needed it: 
Q. You would take these checks out as you 
needed them~ 
A. As I needed the money to live on. 
Q. But you didn't receive a regular salary? 
A. The salary checks were written on a regular 
basis. 
Q. But those checks were not - would not be 
cashed~ 
A. That is right. 
Q. So you received the actual money as you 
needed it; isn't that correct~ 
A. As I chose to draw on 1ny salary account. 
Q. ;yes. 
A. Yes, as I chose to draw against the salary 
check that had been "Tritten." ( Tr. 34, Ll-13) 
It is further emphasized by the fact that ~Ir. Bailey 
and Mrs. Bailey did not even know at the time of the 
trial when stockholders meetings were and if the c·ourt 
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will refer to the deposition of Mr. Bailey, he stated 
iu the deposition he thought it was in September, (Dep. 
13, L 23-26) which he later corrected, and at the time 
of trial he said he thought it was in April, (Tr. 29) 
when, in fact, the Articles of Incorporation stated it 
was in ~lay. See Article V, Sub-section 1 of the By-
La\vs, (Plts. Ex. 4, P. 9) which states that the annual 
stockholders meeting shall be 2:00 P.M. on the first 
Saturday after the first Monday in 1\fay of each year. 
Furthermore, by comparing the transactions indicated 
in the minute book and also by reference to the testimony 
of Mr. and Mrs. Bailey, it is obvious that the corporation 
never complied in any respect with the requirements of 
Article V of the By-Laws, which was another meaning-
less article to Mr. and Mrs. Bailey 
Two Utah cases which are in point and support the 
contentions of the appellants are Western Securvtves Co. 
v. Spiro, 62 U. 623, 221 P. 856, and Geary v. G~ain, et 
al. 79 U. 269, 9 P.2d 396. 
The Western Securities case involved a one-man 
corporation with nominal incorporators. There were 
various transactions between the parties, some with the 
plaintiff corporation and some with its principal stock-
holder, H. P. Clark. Without going into a lengthy com-
parison of the facts, suffice it to say that they were 
analogous. The Court therein said: 
"'That, under certain circumstances, the legal 
entity of the corporation must be entirely disre-
garded is clearly pointed out by the court in the 
case first above cited. (Louisville Banking Co. v. 
Eicenman, 94 Ky. 83, 21 S.vV. 591). The courts 
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have had frequent occasion to consider facts and 
circumstances similar or analogous to those in 
the case at bar, and to apply the law to such 
facts and circumstances. It would be a mere 
travesty of justice if courts could or should refuse 
to look behind the mere form of a transaction 
in order to ascertain the real truth and reach 
and hold responsible the real parties in interst." 
The Geary case was a suit against Gain who had 
but one share of stock in the corporation, however, 
if Gain had been in a circumstance similar to Bailey 
in the principal case then the Court's language would 
have bound him. The court said : 
"It would be applicable (the alter ego theory) 
• • • if Gain, in fact, owned the stock. • • • The 
doctrine simply means that the courts, ignoring 
forms and looking to the substance of things, 
will regard the stockholders of a corporation as 
the owners of its property, or as the real parties 
in interest, whenever it is necessary to do so to 
prevent a fraud which might otherwise go without 
redress, or to do justice which might otherwise 
fail." 
The language .of the Utah Court "Tould seem clearly 
applicable in the case where the Bailey-McCune Com-
pany has made an assignment for the benefit of creditors 
and has not included the plaintiffs. (Tr. 66-67) 
There are many other cases that 'viii support the 
position of the plaintiffs in this respect, a few of which 
are cited as follows: 
First is the case that is very similar in point called 
Stark v. Coker as found in 129 P.2d 390. This is a 
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California case involving defendants John B. Coker 
and Regina W. Coker, his wife. It is a suit by one of 
the creditors to recover an indebtedness that arose on 
a deed of trust. The defense was one of corporate 
iln1nunity. The Court, in discussing the proble1ns, said 
as follows: 
"The two requirements are that there be such 
unity of interest and ownership that the separate 
personalities of the corporation and the individual 
no longer exist and that adherence to the fiction 
of separate existence would, under the circum-
stances, promote fraud, or injustice. On the sec-
ond score it is sufficient that iJt appear that 
recognition of the acts as those of a corporation 
only will produce t~tequitable results. "\Ve believe 
there was sufficient evidence before the lower 
court to justify it in determining that those re-
quirements were met. There were several perti-
nent circumstances. Assuming that at the time· of 
the original indebtedness incurred between 1924 
and 1928, the evidence indicates that there was 
no ground for piercing the corporate veil, it 
appears that from 1931 to 1934, the date of the 
note in question, and thereafter, there were no 
officers elected, no board of directors, or stock-
holders' meetings held and no minute entries. 
At all of those times defendant John B. Coker 
was president of the corporation, owning 139 
of the 150 outstanding shares of stock. His wife, 
defendant Regina Coker, was secretary of the 
corporation and owned 1 share of stock. The other 
11 shares were held in escrow in a bank, the 
whereabouts of the owner thereof being unknoWn 
and he did not participate in the corporation's 
business. The affairs of the corporation were 
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conducted by John B. Coker. The stock had no 
market value. • * ., 
It is interesting to note that the basis for setting 
these things aside is not unlawful misrepresentation 
or fraud, but on the basis that to hold otherwise would 
produce inequitable results, or that injustice would occur 
if corporate emunity were allowed to be used as a 
shield. This concept is rather clearly set forth in the 
landmark case in this alter ego theory which is desig-
nated as Wvttmann v. Wh~ttingham, 259 P. 63. This was 
a case of a one-man corporation. He had, however, 
complied with the formal law and his By-Laws by having 
nominal directors, ··all 'of whom owned one share of 
stock, but the real power and control of the company 
was exercised by the defendant Whittingham. It was 
a suit upon a note owed by the corporation. There was 
no particular evidence of fraud. The rational of the 
case was that this was not a genuine corporation, be-
cause of the attitude of the principal stockholder toward 
it. The Court in this case said as follows: 
"We are of the opinion that there is ample 
evidence from which to conclude that appellant 
was the alter ego of the corporation, and comes 
within the rule laid down in MinifiJe v. Rowley, 
187 Cal. 481, 202 P. 673: 'Before the acts and 
obligations of a corporation can be legally rec-
ognized as those of a particular person, and vice-
versa, the follo,ving co1nbination of circumstances 
must be made to appear: First, that the corpora-
tion is not only influenced and governed by that 
person, but that there is such a unitv of interest 
and ownership that the individuality, or separ-
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ateness, of the said person and corporation has 
ceased ; second, that the facts are such that an 
adherence to the fiction of the separate existence 
of the corporation would, under the particular 
circumstances, sanction a fraud or promote in-
justice." 
It can be easily seen from the rules set down in 
the above case and in the Jl!linifie v. Rowley case that 
there is a unity of interest and ownership here of such 
a nature that the individuality and separateness of W. 
Lee Bailey and Gayle J. Bailey cannot be distinguished 
from that of Bailey-McCune Company. This is even 
more certainly established when you see that they do 
business under Bailey Investment Company, write checks 
under Bailey Investment ·Company to pay the debts of 
Bailey-McCune Company (Tr. 60) and deposited Bailey 
l\fcCune money to the account of Bailey Investment 
Company (Tr. 60). Bailey Investment Company is an-
other personality separate and apart from Bailey-
McCune Company, but an artificial personality or crea-
tion which has no personality separate and apart from 
that of W. Lee Bailey and Gayle J. Bailey, but which 
"\vas the recipient of corporate funds. This is also shown 
by the fact that they did business under the name of 
Rite - Way Stores as well as Bailey- McCune Conl-
pany, which fully exemplifies the personality situation set 
forth in the above citation. How could a person dealing 
,,~ith these people assume that they were dealing with any-
one other than W. Lee Bailey and Gayle J. Bailey because 
Bailey-l\IcCune Company did not have any personality 
separate and apart from these people any more than 
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did Bailey Investment Company or Rite-Way Stores. 
This is even more clearly shown by the evidence pro-
duced at trial. The Court will remember how this lease 
was negotiated and how the payments were received 
and the continual contracts between W. Lee Bailey and 
Ron Shaw and the many personal references made with 
the personal pronoun "I" when speaking of the company. 
We have mentioned in the above citation that fraud 
is not an essential element in a case of this nature. 
We have shown that nonconformity· with statutory re-
quirements and total disregard for corporate formalities 
is an indication of bad faith. It is further proof that 
these people did not regard themselves as a corporation 
except for the purpose of obtaining personal immunity. 
The court has considered these problems before and a 
case that is in point in this respect is Taylor v. Newton, 
which is found in 257 P.2d, Page 68, wherein it is stated: 
"True, there is no showing or claim of fraud 
in the instant case on the· part of Caroline S. 
Wen ban or the corporation plaintiff. Still, as 
previously indicated, vt is not necessary that ac-
tual fr,aud be shown. It is sufficient if a refusal 
to recognize the fact of the identity of the corpor-
ate existence U''l;th that of the lndivvdual would 
br1Jng ,about inequi,table results. All of the facts 
and circu1nstances surrounding the inception of 
and attending the controversy in suit bring the 
case clearly within the t"\YO requiren1ents declared 
in M ~"nvfve v. Rowley, supra, to be sufficient to 
constitute the cause of action stated in the cross-
complaints of the several appellants." 
"In the case of Gordon v. Aztec Brewing Co., 
33 Cal. 2d 514, at page 5:22, 203 P .2d 533, at 
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page 327, the court said: 'The cases· mentioned 
illustrate in a factual context similar to that 
before us the rule that where the recognition of 
the fiction of separate corporate existence would 
foster an injustice or further a fraud the courts 
"Till refuse to recognize it. Stark v. Coker, 20 Cal. 
2d 839, S-tfi, 129 P.2d 390; Pucett~ v. Girola, 20 
Cal. 2d 57-1:, 578, 128 P.2d 13; Shea v. Leonis, 14 
Cal. 2d. 666, 669, 96 P.2d 332. It is not necessary 
that the plaintiff prove actual fraud. It is enough 
if the recognition of the two entities as separate 
would result in an injustice. W enban. Estate, Inc. 
v. Hewlett, 193 Cal. 675, 698, 227 P. 723; M~nifie 
v. Rowley, 187 ·Cal. 481, 488, 202 P. 673. Here 
confusion would be promoted and an unjust re-
sult be accomplished if the maintenance of two 
entities controlled by the same persons and having 
an identical name were permitted to frustrate 
a meritorious claim.' " 
The above case is cited not only for its compilation 
of authority and summary of the law concerning the 
relationship required, but the case also states that the 
significant elements of an alter ego situation are ( 1) 
control, and (2) a stated fact upon which an adherence 
to separate entity would be unjust. This is the very 
language of the court as stated on Page 72 of that 
citation. The plaintiffs cannot think of a situation that 
more clearly fits that test than the principal case. 
I do not believe that the defendants would contend 
that they do not have suficient unity of interest to fall 
'Yithin this alter ego rule. As far as the second element 
is concerned, insolvency furnishes a clear occasion for 
the employment of the doctrine. This factor played an 
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important part in a case involving this principal where 
corporations were involved. 
WiJethoff v. Refining Properties, as found in 47 
P.2d at Page 315, concerns the signing of a lease of 
service station property and held the assignee liable 
for the rent thereof even though they were assignees 
under a corporate form. The important part of the de-
cision, as pertaining to this case, is as stated on Page 
317 of that decision : 
"While it is the general rule that a corpora-
tion is an entity separate and distinct from its 
stockholders, with separate, distinct liabilities and 
obligations, nevertheless there is a well-recog-
nized and firmly settled exception to this general 
rule, that, when necessary to redress fraud, pro-
tect the rights of third persons or prevent a palp-
able injustice, the law and equity will intervene 
and cast aside the legal fiction of independent 
corporate existence, as distinguished from those 
who hold and own the corporate capital stock, 
and deal with the corporation and stockholders 
as identical entities, ''"'ith identical duties and 
obligations. W enban Estate, Inc. v. Hewlett, 193 
Cal. 675, at page 696, 227 P. 733, 731. The fiction 
of corporate entity n1ay be disregarded, where 
one corporation is so organized and controlled 
and its affairs are so conducted that it is, in 
fact, a mere instrumentality or adjunct of another 
corporation. In.dustrval Research Corp. v. General 
Motors Corp. (D.C.) 29 F. (~) 623, 625. See also 
Llewellyn Iron Works v. Abbott Kz~nney Co., 172 
Cal. 210, and cases collated at page 214, 155 P. 
986, 987." 
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Other decisions have reaffirmed the fact that insolv-
ency plus unity of interest and ownership satisfy the 
require1nents of the rule. One of these cases is Sunset 
Farms, Inc. v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. App. 2d 389, 50 
P.2d 106, whcih case has been cited above. Taylor v . 
.~.Vewton also cited above is in point in this respect. 
The rule concerning alter egos has been applied 
between corporations and partnerships and between 
corporations and partnerships and between corporations 
and individuals doing business as corporations, and 
various other analogous situations. The plaintiffs cite 
a few cases in addition to those cited above to show 
the rule as has been set forth in these cases: 
(A). JYiclver v. Norman, 187 or 516, 213 P.2d 144, 
13 ALR 7-±9. This is a lawsuit between joint venturers, 
one joint venturer doing business as a corporation. 
The plaintiff, who was the other party on the joint ven-
ture project, brings an action against the corporation, 
which was doing business as the other party to the 
joint venture. It is in point in that all the stock of 
the corporation was owned by ~lei ver and his wife : 
"vVhile, for all ordinary purposes, a corpora-
tion is regarded as a legal entity separate and 
distinct from its stockholders, yet, as Judge San-
born said in [1nited States v. Milwa~tkee Refr~ger­
ator Transit Co., CC, 142 F. 247, 255, 'when the 
notice of legal entity is used to defeat public 
convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, or de-
fend crime, the law will regard the corporation 
as an association of persons.' See Secur~'V;y Sav-
ings & Tr1tst Co. v. Portland Flour Mills Co., 124 
Or. 276, 288, 261 P. 43:2. In view of the fiduciary 
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relation between the parties, it would be an ob-
vious fraud upon Norman, if, as he asserts, 
erroneous or fabricated charges were made 
against the joint adventure by Equitable, to per-
mit Mciver to escape responsibility for such de-
licts by shielding himself behind the corporate 
form. On the other hand, since Norman insists 
upon this view of the matter where it is to his 
interest to do so, it would be grossly inequitable, 
in considering Norman's contention, that Mciver 
had failed in his obligations to the joint adventure 
and that he was justified for that, among other 
reasons, in excluding Mciver from participation 
in its profits, to say that credit for the corpora-
tion's contribution to the enterprise is to be with-
held from Mciver. We shall, therefore, in our 
discussion of the case, treat Mel ver and Equitable 
as one and the same person.'' 
It is interesting to note from the above citation 
that there was no fraud shown or alleged, but merely 
that the Court felt that it was inequitable under the 
circumstances to allow the defendant to obtain corporate 
emunity when his relationship to the corporation was 
solely for that purpose and that the corporation existed 
for no other reason, and especially since the personali-
ties of the corporation and 1\{cl ver 'Yere one and the same. 
(B). Another case which the Court 1nay find of 
interest is the case of H.A.S. Loan Service v. McColgan, 
21 Cal. 2d 518, 133 P.2d 391. This 'Yas a case where 
there were two corporations 'vhose stockholders 'vere 
primarily the same people. 'Their respective businesses 
were complimentary one to another and one corporation 
could do through the other "That it could not do for 
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it~elf. There was no showing, however, that anything it 
did through the other corporation was illegal per se, 
but merely that the corporate status of the second cor-
poration was strictly one of convenience. The Court in 
this case said as follo,vs: 
HIt is well settled that evidence of this char-
acter is sufficient to support a judgment. Par-
ticularly in cases involving the disregard of a 
corporate entity, the evidence although circum-
stantial is sufficient; each case must rest upon 
its special facts, and such determination is 
peculiarly within the province of the trier of 
fact. See Stark v. Coker, 20 Cal. 2d 839, 129 P.2d 
390. The manner in which the business was con-
ducted, particularly the guarantee of the payment 
of the loans by plaintiff and other circumstances 
above outlined furnished convincing evidence to 
support the findings. The testimony of the officers 
of the plaintiff and Marshall Finance Company 
was that of interested witnesses. Under the cir-
cumstances here presented the two corporate en-
tities were in fact one, or if they be considered 
separate, two, in effect, engaged in a single 
business. The corporate entity may be disregarded 
when it is used to evade the law. 21 c·al. 2d Adv. 
p. 551, 133 p .2d 391." 
The following citation is analogous and we cite it 
merely to show the simplicity by which courts can pierce 
the corporate veil in order to get to the parties in in-
terest: 
"There has been a growing tendency upon 
the part of the courts to disregard corporate 
entity and to treat the stockholders thereof as 
an association of individuals when the interests 
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of justice are to be served." M etropolitam H oldimg 
Co. v. Snyder, 79 F.(2d) 263, 103 ALR 912. 
Another case which is in point in this situation 
Is the case where a creditor formerly supplied Home 
Builders' Supply Company, which was a sole proprietor-
ship. The company later was incorporated and it supplied 
the incorporated company. Prior to supplying the sole 
proprietorship it obtained a guarantee from a person 
who guaranteed the obligations of the sole proprietor-
ship. The court held that the guarantee was effective 
to the corporation and to its principal stockholder in 
as much as there had been no material change in debtors 
and to hold otherwise would be inequitable. The case 
is fairly unique in as much at it is a suit between a 
creditor and the guarantor of the sole proprietorship 
and does not involve the corporation except to show 
that it never did exist, for reason of its alter ego re-
lationship to the principal stockholder. The case does 
not involve the principal stockholder or the corporation. 
It is cited as follows: 
D.N. & E. Walter Co. v. Zuckerman, 6 P.2d 
251, 79 ALR 330. 
"We think the trial court "~as in error in 
its conclusion on the undisputed facts. The cor-
poration was distinctly a one-n1an corporation. It 
was Goldberg's alter ego, co1npletely owned, domi-
nated, and controlled by him. This 'vas also true 
as to the business for1nerly conducted by him 
under the san1e name. To all intents and purposes 
Goldberg at all ti1nes involved herein eontinued 
to transact business under the nan1e of B IIo1ne 
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I3uilder~' Supply Co." The separateness of the 
person and the corporation would of course be 
recognized if no inequitable results would follow. 
But where, as here, an inequitable result would 
follow, the two should be considered as one, and 
the doctrine of Minifie v. Rowley, 187 Cal. 481, 
202 P. 673, and Wenban Estate, Inc. v. Hewlett, 
193 Cal. 675, 227 P. 723, would apply." 
CONCLUSION 
A citation which summarizes the position that we 
have atternpted to state above and is appropriate for 
a concluding reference is that found in 13 Am. Jur. 
160, Sec. 7: 
"The doctrine that a corporation is a legal 
entity existing separate and apart from the per-
sons composing it is a legal theory introduced 
for purposes of convenience and to subserve the 
ends of justice. The concept cannot, therefore, 
be extended to a point beyond its reason and 
policy, and when invoked in support of an end 
subversive of this policy, will be disregarded by 
the courts. Thus, in an appropriate case and in 
furtherance of the ends of justice, a corporation 
and the individual or individuals owning all its 
stock and assets will be treated as identical, the 
corporate entity being disregarded where used as 
a cloak or cover for fraud or illegality." 
In sumn1ary it can be said that the doctrine has 
been applied in many cases and under different theories, 
but the result has always been the same. The principal 
requirements appear to be that there be a unity of 
interest and o'vnership and that the individuality or 
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separateness of the person and of the corporation has 
ceased, and the facts are such that an adherence to the 
fiction of separate existence of the corporation would, 
under the particular circumstance of the case, promote 
an injustice. To hold otherwise here would allow the 
defendants in this case to have benefited personally from 
all the transactions, to have paid themselves salaries, to 
conduct the business for many years, to have sold the 
plaintiffs' merchandise, not accounted for the receipts, 
and to have all of the benefits of personal ownership 
without personal liability. The injustice of it here is 
that they did not ever act as a corporation. They did 
not assume any of the burdens of corporate existence 
as required by their Articles and By-Laws, it being a 
sham from the very conception. Other fact situations 
that support our position that Bailey-McCune Company 
is nothing more than the alter ego of W. Lee Bailey 
and Gayle J. Bailey, his wife, is the co-mingling of 
personal and corporate funds, as evidenced by the man-
ner in which Mr. and Mrs. McCune dre\v their salaries; 
the inadequate capitalization of the company considering 
the debts and liabilities that the company had assumed; 
failure of the officers to conform to standard corporate 
procedures, as above set forth. These are all substantial 
and sufficient reasons for imposing the alter ego doc-
trine. !The elements of the unity of interest and o\vnership 
has been clearly established in as much as ~fr. and ~frs. 
Bailey are the sole and only owners of the stock of 
Bailey-McCune Con1pany, constitute all of the officers 
and directors, and the corporate records and corporate 
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tninute book shows that 1ninutes have not been filed 
since N ovetnber 8, 1952, even though there are supple-
mental documents furnished at the time of trial desig-
nated as minutes but being unsigned and lacking the 
legal for1nalities of minutes. It is also interesting to 
note that in respect to the minutes that time intervals 
in excess of one year have occurred on several occasions 
between directors' meetings. This fact, combined with 
the manner in which they did business, and personal 
references to themselves when referring to the corpora-
tion, is sufficient to show unity of interest and ownership. 
We have also shown that insolvency is a clear oc-
casion for employment of a doctrine of alter ego, for 
it indicates a situation that is inequitable or unjust to 
the creditors and these are sufficient facts to invoke 
the application of the doctrine. We have also shown by 
our citations above that it is a familiar circumstance 
for individuals to use corporate form to conduct a part-
nership or joint venture and that in such cases the 
courts have by-passed the corporate entities and have 
treated the parties relationship as a partnership in 
determining their rights and liabilites. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JACKSON B. HowARD, for 
HOWARD AND LEWIS and 
UDELL JENSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and 
Appellants. 
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